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P arallel proceedings are simultaneous or concurrent criminal,
civil, or administrative enforcement actions against the same
parties for the same violation. Most federal and state environmental
statutes authorize the government to conduct both civil and criminal
investigations and to seek both civil and criminal sanctions.' There
are two general areas of concern which arise when there are
parallel criminal and civil enforcement actions.
The first area of concern involves the manner in which parallel
civil and criminal investigations are conducted. For example, in a
criminal investigation, grand jury secrecy must always be
maintained. Therefore, a prosecutor may not share grand jury
materials with civil enforcement authorities absent a court order.
The second area of concern involves the imposition of civil and
criminal sanctions against the same party for the same conduct.
This raises Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy issues.
This Article will focus on the issues that arise under the Double
Jeopardy Clause when civil and criminal enforcement agencies
bring parallel actions. Part I will introduce the criminal/civil Double
Jeopardy doctrine as enunciated in United States v. Halper.2 Part II
will define "same conduct" and "punishment" in the context of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. In addition, Part II will analyze how
* New Jersey Assistant Attorney General, New Jersey Attorney General's
Office; Union County, New Jersey, Acting Prosecutor.
"" New Jersey Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Acting Chief, Environ-
mental Crimes Bureau, Division of Criminal Justice, New Jersey Attorney Gener-
al's Office.
1. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6916(e); RCRA § 2007 (e) (1994).
2. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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courts have applied Halper to situations in which the government
has sought civil monetary penalties and criminal sanctions for the
same conduct. Part III will review how courts have applied Halper
when the government, in parallel proceedings, has sought civil non-
monetary sanctions, such as forfeiture and debarment, as well as
criminal sanctions. This Article will conclude that the nature of the
civil action in parallel criminal and civil environmental enforcement
proceedings determines whether Halper-type Double Jeopardy
concerns are raised.
PART I
A. Introduction
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which guarantees that no person shall
"be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb,"3 is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The Double Jeopardy
Clause bars retrial of criminal charges after acquittal,5 and bars a
second trial for the same offense.6 It precludes retrial after
prosecutorial misconduct causes a mistrial,7 and prevents the impo-
sition of a harsher sentence on a defendant after a successful ap-
peal.' Thus, the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause bars
succeeding criminal trials after acquittal or conviction and multiple
punishments for the same conduct.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Halper,9 however, the
Court had never addressed the Double Jeopardy implications of
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796-97 (1969) (holding that petitioner
acquitted of larceny but convicted of burglary in first trial did not have to suffer
retrial on larceny count on appeal of burglary charge).
5. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986) (rejecting the state's at-
tempt to seek review of trial court's grant of demurrer to criminal defendants).
6. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
7. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
8. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (holding that Fifth
Amendment guarantees are violated when punishment already exacted for an of-
fense is not fully credited towards sentencing upon a new conviction for the same
offense).
9. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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parallel proceedings in which a party faces concurrent, but separate,
enforcement actions. An example of when a party is subject to con-
current enforcement actions is when the party faces criminal prose-
cution and civil or administrative action for the same conduct.
B. United States v. Halper
The parallel proceedings double jeopardy issue was brought to
the fore when the Court decided United States v. Halper. In Halper,
the defendant was indicted on 65 counts of violating the federal
criminal false claims statute,' ° and 16 counts of mail fraud." The
total amount of false claims made by the defendant was $585.12
He was convicted on all counts, sentenced to imprisonment for two
years, and fined $5,000.13 Subsequently, the Government sought
statutory civil fines under the False Claims Act of $2,000 for each
of the defendant's 65 violations. 4 This totalled $130,000."5 The
district court refused to impose this $2,000 per count statutory
penalty because it constituted a second punishment, and was thus
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Government took a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 16
The Supreme Court held that "a civil, as well as a criminal sanc-
tion, can constitute punishment when the sanction, as applied to the
individual case, serves the goal of punishment."' 7 Thus, the Court
held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who al-
ready has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be
subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the sec-
ond sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only
as a deterrent or retribution.' ' The Court noted that, for example,
the process of "affixing a sanction that compensates the Govern-
10. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
11. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 438. The False Claims Act is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731
(1994).
15. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
16. Id. at 439-40.
17. Id. at 448.
18. Id. at 448-49.
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ment for all of its costs inevitably involves an element of rough
justice."' 9 The Court held:
The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant previously has sus-
tained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the sub-
sequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of com-
pensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify
as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word, then the defen-
dant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages
and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a
second punishment."
The Court stated that this rule is for the "rare case, the case such
as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a
prolific, but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused."'"
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the dis-
parity between the Government's costs and the defendant's civil
liability was so disproportionate as to constitute a second punish-
ment and a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.2" However,
the matter was remanded to provide the government an opportu-
nity to present an accounting of its actual costs arising from the
defendant's fraud. Therefore, under Halper, the Government
would have been entitled to receive a judgement that was ratio-
nally related to the goal of making the Government whole.
Since Halper, courts have been forced to resolve constitutional
parallel proceedings issues in an increasing number of situations,
including environmental cases.
19. Id. at 449.
20. Id. at 449-50.
21. Id. at 449. In Merin v. Maglacki, the New Jersey Supreme Court recog-
nized that, while civil penalties can rise to the level of punishment, they will sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny except "in the 'stark situation' in which the State's
recovery is 'exponentially greater than the amount of the fraud' and 'many times
the amount of the Government's total loss."' 126 N.J. 430, 443 (1992) (quoting
Halper, 490 U.S. at 445).
22. Halper, 490 U.S. at 452.
23. Id.
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PART II
'A. What is Same Conduct?
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second punishment for the
same conduct.24 The first issue under Halper is whether a subse-
quent civil penalty addresses the same conduct as a criminal
penalty.' If the civil penalty addresses the same conduct as the
criminal penalty, and constitutes punishment, the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause may bar the imposition of the civil penalty. 6 Howev-
er, if the civil penalty does not address the same conduct as the
criminal penalty, the issue of whether the civil penalty rises to a
level of punishment is not raised and, therefore, it need not be
decided." In order to hold that both penalties do not address the
same conduct, the court must find that the civil and criminal
statutes under which the defendant is being tried each require
proof of different facts.'
The "same conduct" requirement does not bar the government
from obtaining judgements against different defendants involved
in the same case. It is well established that the protection of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is intrinsically personal.29 Thus, if a
corporation incurs a criminal punishment, the later imposition of
a criminal punishment against corporate officers or shareholders
would not be barred.3" In United States v. Louisville Edible Oil
Products, Inc., the court held that even if the civil penalty as-
sessed against Louisville Edible, a subchapter S corporation,
proved to be punitive under Halper, that determination would not
bar criminal prosecution of two corporate employees.3
Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not "prevent the
Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penal-
24. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
25. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
26. Id. at 442.
27. United States v. Mayers, 957 F.2d 858, 860 (11 th Cir. 1992).
28. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710-12 (1993); Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
29. United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 F.2d 584, 586 (6th
Cir. 1991) (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447).
30. See id. at 586.
31. Id.
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ty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in
the same proceeding."32 If both penalties are sought in a single
proceeding, the issue is only whether the total punishment ex-
ceeds that which is authorized by law.33
B. What is Punishment?
In Halper, the civil penalty followed a criminal conviction.34
It is axiomatic that a criminal penalty always embodies a punitive
purpose. Since Halper, courts have held that Halper's analysis
should apply whether the civil penalty precedes or follows the
criminal proceeding.35 Halper does not require the government
to prosecute a criminal action first in order to avoid the possibili-
ty that the relief obtained in a civil or administrative proceeding
might be deemed punitive and thereby foreclose resort to the
wider array of penalties available in a criminal case.36 However,
a civil or administrative penalty that fails to meet Halper's
"rough justice" test 7 may serve to preclude any subsequent
criminal prosecution or the imposition of criminal punishment."
32. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450.
33. Id. See also United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,
33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116
S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
34. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
35. United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992). See also United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d
1105, 1113 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 171 (1995); United States v.
Austin, 54 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263,
267 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990); New Jersey v. Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, 1315-
16, cert. denied, 598 A.2d 898 (1991).
36. See United States v. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. 536, 542 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff d
974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
37. Halper's "rough justice" test requires a court to determine whether a prior
civil or administrative penalty goes beyond the remedial purpose of compensating
the Government for its costs, and takes on the quality of punishment. Halper, 490
U.S. at 449.
38. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. at 542.
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C. Can A Civil Monetary Sanction Constitute Punishment?
As stated previously, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second
punishment for the same conduct. In Halper, the Court held that
a civil sanction that does not solely serve a remedial purpose, but
rather only serves retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.39 This suggests that a sanc-
tion should not be examined to see if there is some incidental
punitive impact that is an inevitable consequence of its remedial
function, but rather to see if punishment is the purpose the sanc-
tion may be said to serve.' Therefore, the labels "civil" and
"criminal" are not of "paramount importance" in deciding wheth-
er a civil sanction constitutes punishment." The importance is
the remedial or compensatory purpose of the civil sanction.
The Halper Court held that the determination of whether a
given civil sanction constitutes "punishment" requires a particu-
larized, individualized assessment of the penalty imposed and the
purposes that the penalty may serve.4' One question in each case
is whether the civil sanction does more than merely compensate
the Government for its damages and costs.43 In Halper, the
Court acknowledged that such a determination would not be an
exact pursuit." The Court noted that it will be difficult, if not
impossible, in most cases for a court to determine the precise
dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its reme-
dial purposes.45 The following cases illustrate how courts have
applied the "rough justice" analysis set forth in Halper.
In United States v. WRW Corp.,' the court held that civil pen-
alties totalling over $90,000 against the defendant corporation for
39. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
40. Doe v. Porlitz, 662 A.2d 367, 394 (N.J. 1995).
41. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447; Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994); see United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105,
1114 (2d Cir. 1995).
42. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448; see also United States v. Walker, 940 F.2d 442,
444 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a civil sanction constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goal of punishment).
43. Morgan, 51 F.3d at 1114.
44. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
45. Id.
46. 986 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1993).
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violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act did not
constitute punishment under Halper.47 In WRW Corp., three indi-
vidual defendants, who were the sole shareholders, officers, and
directors of the corporation, had been convicted of willful viola-
tions of mandatory health and safety standards under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act' after the fines against the corpora-
tion were levied.49 After the defendants were released from pris-
on, the Government sought to recover the $90,000 of civil penal-
ties which had been assessed against the corporation. The Court
of Appeals found that the civil penalty assessment in this case
was not so extreme and divorced from the Government's expens-
es incurred in the investigation and prosecution to constitute
punishment." The court further noted that the failure to consider
the Government's expenses when assessing the amount of the
penalty did not alter the trial court's ruling that the penalty was
rationally related to the goal of making the government whole.5
In United States v. Furlett,52 an administrative law judge for
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") found
that the defendants had violated provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act ("CEA")53 and regulations of the CFTC. The
judge imposed a civil fine of $75,000 on each defendant. In addi-
tion, the judge revoked the defendants' registrations with the
CFTC, ordered them to cease further CEA violations, and prohib-
ited the defendants from trading in any contract market.54
Shortly thereafter, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
charging the defendants with crimes based upon the same under-
lying facts. The defendants moved to dismiss the grand jury in-
dictment.55 The Seventh Circuit found that the civil penalties im-
posed by the administrative law judge did not constitute punish-
47. Id.
48. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.
(1986 & Supp. 1996).
49. WRW, 986 F.2d at 140.
50. Id. at 142.
51. Id.
52. 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
53. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-51 (1994).
54. Furlett, 974 F.2d at 841.
55. Id.
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ment under Halper.5 6 The court held that the district court's fail-
ure to consider the Government's loss when imposing the
$75,000 civil penalty did not imply that the fine was unrelated to
the Government's loss.5 7 The Seventh Circuit further held that
the Government's affidavits in response to defendants' motion
provided sufficient facts for the district court to conclude that the
civil fine was commensurate with the Government's losses.5"
The affidavit did not specify the exact costs of investigating the
defendants' activities but rather only provided a rough approxi-
mation of the hours spent investigating the case.59 The court,
citing Halper, noted that the trial court's assessment of the Gov-
ernment's costs "will not be an exact pursuit."' The court also
held that the administrative law judge's order prohibiting the de-
fendants from trading on any contract market was remedial.6'
The court found that this prohibition can be seen as an action to
ensure the integrity of markets and protect them from individuals
like the defendants.62
In United States v. Sanchez-Escareno,63 U.S. Customs officials
arrested the defendant and assessed a large civil fine for possess-
ing marijuana and attempting to import it into the United States.
The defendant executed promissory notes in which he agreed to
pay the fine. The Government did not seek to collect on these
notes. Sometime thereafter, the Government obtained an indict-
ment against the defendant based on the same conduct underlying
the civil fine. The Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's execu-
tion of promissory notes, in the absence of a judgment or pay-
ment by the defendant, did not constitute "punishment" under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.64 The Fifth Circuit found that the notes
56. Id. at 843-45.
57. Id. at 843-44.
58. Id. at 844.
59. Id.; see also United States v. Walker, 940 F.2d at 444; New Jersey v.
Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, cert. denied, 126 N.J. 342 (1991).
60. Furlett, 974 F.2d at 844 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
449 (1989)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 950 F.2d 193, 194-96 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992).
64. Id. at 201.
1996] 727
728 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
were not an actual payment or actual satisfaction of the imposed
civil penalty.65
In United States v. Hall,' the Government obtained a guilty
plea to a charge of transporting negotiable instruments out of the
United States without filing required currency reports. The defen-
dant was sentenced to a prison term, fined, and ordered to per-
form community service.67 Thereafter, the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment assessed a $1,035,000 civil penalty upon the defendant for
the same conduct.6' Both parties moved for summary judgment
in the district court.69 The Government stated that it had suffered
"immeasurable damages as a result of Hall's misconduct, includ-
ing the 'heavy burden' of investigation and prosecution, the 'vast
sums expended to monitor the borders of the United States, and
to maintain liaison with other countries in order to discover such
criminal conduct."' 7 The court found that the Government put
forth "only the most minimal effort in establishing a rational
relationship between the $1,035,000 civil penalty and the goal of
making the Government whole."'" Additionally, the Government
made no attempt to quantify the actual losses it had suffered from
the defendant's conduct.7 In this case, the court held that the
fine was not rationally related to the goal of making the Gov-
ernment whole.73 The court reasoned that in the absence of
quantification of actual losses, the disproportionate relationship
between the amount of the fine, and the damages caused by the
defendant was the justification for its conclusion.74
While the Hall court placed far greater demands on the Gov-
ernment than most other courts deciding the issue, Hall's holding
stands for the proposition that the prosecuting agency cannot
cavalierly paint its losses with a broad brush. Halper requires the
65. Id. at 202.
66. 730 F. Supp. 646, 647 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
67. Id. at 647.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 647-48.
70. Id. at 654.
71. Id. at 655.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Government to establish that the penalty it is seeking is rationally
related to the goal of making the Government whole.75 There-
fore, the Government needs to present some accounting of the
costs of investigation and prosecution, as well as its losses.
PART III
Can Non-Monetary Sanctions Constitute Punishment?
Courts have held that debarments and suspensions are remedial
rather than punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause.76 In
United States v. Bizzell,77 the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") filed administrative complaints
against two defendants alleging various violations of HUD regu-
lations, reaching settlement agreements with both.78 One defen-
dant agreed to accept a voluntary exclusion from HUD programs
for two years conditioned upon his payment to HUD of
$30,000.7' The other defendant agreed not to participate in HUD
programs for eighteen months.8" Thereafter, both defendants
were indicted for various crimes arising from essentially the same
transactions and violations set forth in HUD's administrative
complaints.8" The court held that the penalty of debarment in
this case was "strictly remedial." 2 The court stated, "[iut is the
clear intent of debarment to purge government programs of cor-
75. See supra part I.B.
76. See United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1992);
Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (1 lth Cir. 1992); United States
v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990). In Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1
(1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld "Megan's Law" which requires
convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and pro-
vide for community notification of the name and address of the sex offender un-
der certain circumstances. Id. at 14. The court ruled that both the registration and
the notification requirements have a solely regulatory purpose. Id. at 75. There-
fore, as the provisions "do not constitute punishment, they do not violate any
constitutional prohibition against punishment." Id. at 76.
77. 921 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1990).
78. Id. at 265.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 267.
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rupt influences and to prevent improper dissipation of public
funds." 3 The court also found that the $30,000 one of the defen-
dants agreed to pay was not punitive because it was not "over-
whelmingly disproportionate" to the damages caused by the
defendant's actions.84
In Manocchio v. Kusserow,"5 the defendant pleaded guilty to
filing a fraudulent Medicare claim, received a probationary sen-
tence, and was ordered to pay restitution and a $1,000 fine. 6
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") notified the defendant that it would exclude
him from participating in Medicare programs for at least five
years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7." The court held that the
legislative intent of the section 1320a-7 exclusionary period was
to "protect present and future Medicare beneficiaries from the
abusers of these programs. 8 Therefore, the court viewed the
exclusion as remedial, not punitive, under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.89
These cases make it clear that one of the remedial purposes a
civil or administrative action can achieve, without running afoul
of Halper, is to protect the integrity of the regulatory system.
Until recently, the state of the law was somewhat unclear as to
whether a civil forfeiture action constitutes punishment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
In United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,' the Ninth
Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause will bar the govern-
ment from pursuing a civil forfeiture action after it has obtained
criminal convictions. 9' In $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the Gov-
ernment instituted a civil forfeiture action five days after the
grand jury issued a superseding indictment in a parallel criminal
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 961 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 1540.
87. Id. at 1540-41.
88. Id. at 1542.
89. Id.
90. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116
S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
91. Id. at 1222.
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case. 92 Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the criminal
case proceeded first and resulted in the conviction and sentencing
of the defendant on various counts of conspiracy and money
laundering. 93 Thereafter, a trial court granted the Government's
summary judgement motion in the civil forfeiture proceeding and
ordered the property in question to be forfeited to the Govern-
ment.94
In revising this decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Gov-
ernment chose to pursue its forfeiture in a separate and parallel
proceeding, rather than including criminal forfeiture in the indict-
ment.95 The court held that for double jeopardy purposes, crim-
inal prosecutions, such as those in this case, constitute separate
proceedings from parallel civil forfeiture actions. 96 The court
further held that the only fair reading of the Court's decision in
United States v. Austin97 was that it resolved the punishment
issue for forfeiture cases with respect to both the Excessive Fines
92. Id. at 1214. The government claimed the property was subject to forfeiture
as proceeds of illegal narcotic transactions under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and as
property involved in money laundering violations under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A). Id. Section 881(a)(6) provides that the government may seize
"[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance ... [and] all proceeds traceable to such an exchange .... "21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1994). Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ny
property, real or personal, involved in [money laundering activities]." 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (1994).
93. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1214.
94. Id. at 1215.
95. Id. at 1216.
96. Id.
97. 509 U.S. 602 (1993). In Austin, the Supreme Court held that a forfeiture
of property under 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is a monetary punishment
and is thus subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) provides: "The following shall be subject to
forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:. . . (4)
All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1),
(2), or (9) [controlled dangerous substances]...; (7) all real property... which is
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter .. .9
19961
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Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause.98 The court found that
the money laundering statute which provided the basis for the
forfeiture in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency had a punitive purpose
and thus triggered the Double Jeopardy Clause.99
The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, have held that the forfei-
ture of proceeds from illegal activities does not constitute punish-
ment under Halper."° In United States v. Tilley, 0 the Fifth
Circuit held that the forfeiture of illegal drug proceeds under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) is not punishment under Halper.°2 In Tilley,
the Government filed a civil forfeiture complaint under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7) against certain real and personal property
belonging to the defendants. °3 Shortly thereafter, the Govern-
ment filed a criminal indictment against the defendants charging
them with various drug-related crimes. Following the entry of a
final judgement against the defendants with respect to the person-
al property, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on
double jeopardy grounds."°M
The court held that under Halper, the forfeiture of unlawful
proceeds under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) must be classified as pun-
ishment if the amount of the proceeds forfeited is so great that it
bears no rational relation to the costs incurred by society and the
Government resulting from the defendant's conduct.0 5 The
court found that the forfeiture of proceeds in this particular case
was not grossly disproportionate to societal and governmental
costs by citing the costs to the Government for detecting, investi-
gating, and prosecuting drug traffickers and the costs to society
for combatting the allure of drugs and caring for victims of the
criminal trade when preventive efforts prove unsuccessful."°
98. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219.
99. Id. at 1222.
100. See United States v. $184,505.01 U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir.
1995); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
101. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 297.
105. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 298-99.
106. Id. at 299.
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Therefore, the court held the forfeiture in this case was not pun-
ishment and thus did not warrant a double jeopardy bar. °7
The court stated that because Austin dealt with the forfeiture of
conveyances, rather than proceeds of illegal conduct, it was not
applicable to this case."8 The court noted that "[u]nlike the real
estate forfeiture statute that can result in the confiscation of the
most modest mobile home, or the stateliest mansion, the forfei-
ture of drug proceeds will always be directly proportional to the
amount of drugs sold."'" The court also held that, even without
using the Halper rational relation test, the forfeiture of illegal
proceeds was not punishment because the property taken by the
government was derived from unlawful activities.'
In United States v. $184,505.01 U.S. Currency,"' the Third
Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Tilley that,
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), proceeds from illegal drug transac-
tions or proceeds traceable to such transactions do not constitute
punishment under Halper. The Third Circuit rejected the "con-
trary reasoning and conclusion of the Ninth Circuit regarding 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).""' 2  Applying the Blockburger/Dixon
test,"3 the court also found that the defendant's forfeiture fol-
lowing his criminal conviction did not constitute double jeopardy
because the crimes and forfeitures were not predicated on the
same offense." 4
In United States v. Salinas,"5  and United States v.
Ursery,"6 the Sixth Circuit also adopted the view of Tilley that
107. Id. at 300.
108. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 72 F.3d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir. 1995).
112. Id. at 1169.
113. The Blockburger/ Dixon test provides that "where the same act or transac-
tion constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 1169 (quoting
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
114. Id. at 1171.
115. 65 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1995).
116. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
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the forfeiture of drug proceeds is not punishment, but is remedial
in nature. In Tilley, the court found that the forfeiture of drug
proceeds is different from the forfeiture of property used or in-
tended to be used to facilitate a crime." 7 The court noted that
although drug proceeds are inherently proportional to the damag-
es caused by the illegal activity, one never acquires a property
right to such proceeds.'
In June 1996, the Supreme Court resolved the split among the
federal circuits." 9 The Court held that in rem civil forfeitures
are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.' The Court found that "nothing in Halper,
Kurth Ranch,'2' or Austin purported to replace our traditional
understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment
for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause."'2 2 The Court
noted that "Congress has long authorized the Government to
bring parallel criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceed-
ings, and this Court consistently has found civil forfeitures not to
constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause."'23
Applying the two part analysis set forth in United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms,'24 the Court first found that Con-
gress intended forfeiture proceedings under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (7) to be civil. 25
The Court then went on to find that these provisions were not so
117. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
118. Id. See also Ursery, 59 F.3d at 572-73 (holding that the forfeiture of prop-
erty used to facilitate a crime constitutes punishment).
119. The Court consolidated Ursery and United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, for review into United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
120. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
121. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994).
122. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
123. Id.
124. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). The two part analysis referred to in Ursery requires
"asking first, whether Congress intended the particular forfeiture to be a remedial
civil sanction or a criminal penalty, and second, whether the forfeiture proceed-
ings were so punitive in fact as to establish that they may not legitimately be
viewed as civil in nature, despite any congressional intent to establish a civil
remedial mechanism." Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
125. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
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punitive in form to somehow render them criminal. 2 6 Thus, the
Court has taken a categorical view that in rem civil forfeitures are
not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 12 7 Accordingly,
the type of case-by-case analysis discussed in Halper is no longer
applicable in in rem civil forfeitures.
CONCLUSION
Since a criminal penalty will always be viewed as punitive, the
real issue in parallel proceedings cases is the nature of the penal-
ty imposed in the civil action and the nature of the civil action
itself. Under Halper, if that penalty is rationally related to a re-
medial goal, it is not punitive and double jeopardy protection will
not be offended. In cases where the remedial/punitive distinction
is unclear, a Halper-type hearing may be required. At this hear-
ing, the prosecution has an opportunity to establish the cost of
pursuing the action and the damages caused by the action. Since
the government is entitled to "rough justice", the necessary proof
to demonstrate a remedial, non-punitive purpose is not an exact
science. Indeed, Halper indicates that treble damages are reason-
able liquidated damages.
Environmental enforcement actions that order expenditures for
upgrades, clean-ups and even penalties perform a regulatory func-
tion and fulfill a remedial purpose. That some deterrent impact
results from these actions does not alter their remedial character
and turn them into punitive sanctions aimed at punishment. Un-
less a defendant faces parallel punishment proceedings, double
jeopardy protection cannot be used to eliminate one of these
prosecutions.
126. Id. at 2148.
127. Id. at 2149.
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